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Abstract
This article critically analyses the reparations and asset forfeiture framework at the
Extraordinary African Chambers and its application in the case against Hissène
Habré. It identifies obstacles to implementing the reparations awarded and calls
for states and international organizations to support their realization for the sake
of Habré’s victims, without whose efforts the tribunal might not exist. It argues
that international(ized) criminal tribunals should more readily utilize fines and forfeit-
ure as penalties to alleviate the pressure on trust funds to implement reparations
awards, particularly in cases where convicted persons possess substantial assets.
Lastly, in light of the requirement that assets susceptible to forfeiture orders be
derived directly or indirectly from the crime(s) of which a person is found guilty,
the article questions the failure of the prosecutor to charge Habré with the war
crime of pillage, despite its availability in the tribunal’s statute and the finding
that the suffering of many of Habré’s victims entitled to individual compensation
resulted from pillage.
Keywords
Reparations, forfeiture of assets, Extraordinary African Chambers, Senegal, Hissène
Habré, Chad
FINANCING REPARATIONS AT INTERNATIONAL(IZED) CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS
On 27 April 2017, the Appeals Chamber of the Extraordinary African
Chambers (EAC) issued its judgment in the case against Hissène Habré, a
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former president of Chad.1 In the appeal judgment, which confirmed his con-
viction for crimes against humanity, torture and war crimes, the Appeals
Chamber also ordered Habré to pay compensation equivalent to more than
USD 145 million to the victims of his crimes.2 This is the largest amount of
compensation awarded against a convicted person by an international(ized)
criminal tribunal (ICT)3 and, although significant for recognizing the vast
harm suffered by Habré’s victims, the award of such a huge sum presents a
number of challenges, including how to finance the reparations awarded.
In light of the difficulties in funding organs established to administer repara-
tions at ICTs, this article analyses the law and practice of the EAC, from which, it
argues, lessons can be learned for the permanent International Criminal Court
(ICC). The article questions why the EAC prosecutor failed to charge Hissène
Habré with the war crime of pillage, despite its inclusion in the EAC’s constitu-
ent instrument and in view of the requirement that assets susceptible to
orders for forfeiture be derived directly or indirectly from the crime(s) of
which a person is found guilty. Furthermore, the article argues that, in situa-
tions similar to that of Habré, where an accused or convicted person possesses
(or is able to access) significant assets, ICTs ought to place greater emphasis on
fines and the forfeiture of assets so as to reduce their reliance on voluntary
donations to meet the cost of reparations. Finally, the article identifies the sub-
stantial pressure on the EAC Trust Fund (Trust Fund) to implement reparation
awards ordered against Habré in the absence of sufficient assets to meet the
entire compensation awarded.
Assets belonging to convicted persons can be used to finance reparations
awarded to the victims of international crimes.4 As Nader Iskander Diab put
it, “[t]he unavailability of assets is probably the greatest challenge in funding
court ordered reparations. Due to their nature as the product of a court ruling,
the obligation to fund them rests on the convicted person and stems fromhis /
her civil responsibility for the harm caused”.5 Without such assets, trust funds
1 Le Procureur Général v Hissein Habré Appeals Chamber, 27 April 2017 (appeal judgment).
2 Id at 226.
3 On 24 March 2017, the International Criminal Court Trial Chamber II issued an order for
reparations against Germain Katanga, in which it found that, despite his indigence, he
was liable for the sum of USD 1 million. See Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, order for
reparations pursuant to article 75 of the statute (ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-tENG) 24 March
2017 (Order for Reparations), para 264. On 8 March 2018, this was confirmed by the
Appeals Chamber; see Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, public redacted judgment on the
appeals against the Order for Reparations (ICC-01/04-01/07-3778-Red) 8 March 2018,
para 186.
4 This is explicitly recognized in art 79(2) of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC Statute): “The Court may order money and other property collected
through fines or forfeiture to be transferred, by order of the Court, to the Trust Fund.”
5 NI Diab “Challenges in the implementation of the reparation award against Hissein
Habré: Can the spell of unenforceable awards across the globe be broken?” (2018) 16
Journal of International Criminal Justice 141 at 150. See also C Ferstman “Cooperation
and the International Criminal Court: The freezing, seizing and transfer of assets for
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established to implement reparations awards, among other tasks, may not
realize their objectives. The ICC is illustrative in this regard because its Trust
Fund for Victims (TFV) largely relies on voluntary donations to meet its objec-
tives. The TFV regulations provide that the body shall be funded from four
sources: voluntary contributions; proceeds collected through fines or orders
for forfeiture; resources drawn from reparations awards; and other funds allo-
cated by the Assembly of States Parties.6 However, voluntary contributions are
by no means reliable. For example, the TFV’s financial statements for 2015
show that both voluntary contributions and, consequently, its fiscal surplus
declined because of the financial pressure facing donors due to the arrival
in Europe of large numbers of migrants and refugees.7 Reflecting on the chal-
lenges facing the TFV, Sara Kendall accurately observes that its reliance on vol-
untary donations is exacerbated by “its dual mandate of providing general
assistance as well as dispensing court-ordered reparations following convic-
tions”,8 rendering its finances particularly tenuous.
Like a limited number of victim-oriented ICTs,9 the EAC has a reparations
framework, pursuant to which compensation (reparations awards), among
other measures, may be ordered directly against convicted persons. If the com-
pensation is (partially) financed from the assets of the convicted person, the
assets seized require no link to the crime(s) for which the person has been con-
victed.10 Orders for fines against a convicted person also require no such evi-
dential connection. Conversely, only those assets derived directly or indirectly
from the crime(s) of which a person is found guilty are susceptible to orders
for forfeiture, thereby excluding other assets that do not have such a link to
the offences. Reparations mechanisms cannot operate effectively without
funds, nor, it is argued, should they be expected to bear this heavy burden
in cases where a convicted person possesses substantial wealth.11
Several persons accused or convicted of genocide, crimes against human-
ity or war crimes have amassed substantial wealth, whether through the
contd
the purpose of reparations” in O Bekou and DJ Birkett (eds) Cooperation and the
International Criminal Court: Perspectives from Theory and Practice (2016, Brill Nijhoff) 227
at 234.
6 Reg 21 of the Regulations of the TFV, ICC-ASP/4/Res.3, annex (3 December 2005).
7 See “ASP 15th session: Financial statements of the Trust Fund for Victims for the year
ended 31 December 2015”, ICC-ASP/15/13 (11 August 2016) at 21, available at: <http://
www.legal-tools.org/doc/55f6b0/> (last accessed 25 April 2019).
8 S Kendall “Commodifying global justice: Economies of accountability at the
International Criminal Court” (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 113 at 124.
9 These include the ICC, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the
Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office.
10 On which, see Ferstman “Cooperation and the International Criminal Court”, above at
note 5 at 234.
11 On some of the difficulties faced in financing reparations awards when the convicted per-
son is indigent, see Diab “Challenges in the implementation”, above at note 5 at 150–57.
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commission of these crimes12 and / or by other, not necessarily criminal,
means.13 Hissène Habré appears to fall into this category of affluent offen-
ders. According to the Commission of Inquiry established by the new
Chadian government following the dictator’s fall from power,14 each year
movable and immovable goods worth an estimated one billion CFA francs,15
were “plundered and confiscated from peaceful citizens” by the Habré
regime.16 The commission’s report further observes that most plundered
goods of high value, including “deluxe carpets, vehicles, gold jewelry [sic],
etc”, were transferred to the presidency.17 Although this conduct is not
necessarily connected, directly or indirectly, to the international crimes of
which Habré was ultimately found guilty, their proceeds could form part
of awards for reparations made against him following his conviction.
There are numerous potential obstacles to funding reparations awards with
the assets of convicted persons, although these can arguably be overcome,
except where the individual is deemed to be indigent. Diab identifies three
such hurdles.18 First, there is a need for swift action by the relevant ICT. In
the words of ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, “existing technology makes it possible
for a person to place most of his assets and moveable property beyond the
Court’s reach in only a few days”.19 Further potential obstacles identified by
Diab could arise from the legal framework(s) applicable in the state(s) in
which the assets are held20 and a lack of asset tracing capability at ICTs. It is
difficult to contest the former, although it is noted with regard to the ICC
12 See M Galvis Martínez “Forfeiture of assets at the International Criminal Court: The short
arm of international criminal justice” (2014) 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 193
at 195–204. Galvis Martínez identifies enslavement, sexual exploitation, the taking of
hostages, pillaging and the unlawful appropriation, seizure or destruction of property
as potentially lucrative international crimes.
13 For example, at the time of his first appearance before the ICC, Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo is reported to have owned “a large business empire”: see M Simons
“Jean-Pierre Bemba, Congolese politician, appears in Hague court” (4 July 2008) The
New York Times at A5. It is noted, however, that the ICC Appeals Chamber acquitted
Mr Bemba of war crimes and crimes against humanity on 8 June 2018. See Prosecutor v
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo
against Trial Chamber III’s judgment pursuant to article 74 of the statute
(ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red) 8 June 2018.
14 Commission of Inquiry Chad: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and
Misappropriations Committed by Ex-President Habré, his Accomplices, and / or Accessories:
Investigation of Crimes Against the Physical and Mental Integrity of Persons and their Possessions (7
May 1992), available at: <http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/
Chad-Report.pdf> (last accessed 25 April 2019) (Chad Report).
15 At the time of writing, equivalent to more than USD 1.75 million.
16 Chad Report, above at note 14 at 92.
17 Id at 82.
18 Diab “Challenges in the implementation”, above at note 5 at 153–54.
19 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, decision concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s decision of
10 February 2006 and the incorporation of documents into the record of the case against
Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr) 24 February 2006, para 137.
20 Diab “Challenges in the implementation”, above at note 5 at 153.
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that state parties to the court’s constituent instrument are under an obliga-
tion to “ensure that there are procedures available under their national law
for all of the forms of cooperation” specified under part IX.21 This extends
to the “identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property
and assets and instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeit-
ure” under article 93(1)(k) of the court’s statute. Should a state’s legal frame-
work prove problematic in this respect, then that state’s legislature could
revise, for example, onerous requirements pertaining to the provisional freez-
ing of assets in core international crimes cases. The ICC has explicitly discussed
the idea of state parties adjusting their domestic cooperation laws for such
purposes.22 Otherwise, or additionally, as Diab acknowledges,23 asset-tracing
expertise could be sought in the form of financial investigators. As for
in-house expertise, the ICC employs dedicated financial investigators in its
Registry and Office of the Prosecutor; it has, however, been observed that
such resources are limited at both court and state party levels and that further
specialist training and resources would be welcome to strengthen the ICC’s
capacity to conduct successful financial investigations.24
THE REPARATIONS AND FORFEITURE FRAMEWORK IN THE EAC
STATUTE
In 2012, the African Union and the Republic of Senegal established the EAC
within the Senegalese court system to try international crimes committed
in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990.25 That agreement was
the fruit of more than two decades of victim and civil society advocacy, litiga-
tion at the International Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the
Economic Community of West African States, as well as negotiations between
the African Union and the Senegalese government. It is beyond the scope of
this article to recount the history of the tribunal, which has been considered
21 ICC Statute, above at note 4, art 88.
22 See ICC “Report on cooperation challenges faced by the courtwith respect to financial inves-
tigations:Workshop 26–27October 2015, TheHague,Netherlands: Forward-looking conclu-
sions” (October 2015) at 3, available at: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/other/161027-ICC-
Rep-Eng.pdf> (last accessed 25 April 2019): “States Parties have an obligation to adopt proce-
dures that facilitate the implementation of all forms of cooperation requests including in
the areaof financial investigations (article 93(1)(k) of theRomeStatue [sic]). As financial inves-
tigations are becoming an increasingly important part of the Court’s work, States Parties
should ensure that they are able to ‘fully cooperate’ in this area.” (emphasis original).
23 Diab “Challenges in the implementation”, above at note 5 at 153.
24 ICC “Report on cooperation challenges”, above at note 22 at 7.
25 Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the African Union
on the Establishment of Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese Courts, avail-
able in French in African Yearbook of International Law Online / Annuaire Africain de Droit
International Online (2011, Brill / Nijhoff) at 403–10 and in English, id at 437–42.
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at length elsewhere.26 Nevertheless, the vital role played by victims’ groups
and civil society organizations in establishing the EAC is particularly
noteworthy.
The participation of victims as civil parties to proceedings before the tribu-
nal is regulated by the EAC Statute27 and, as a tribunal housed within the
Senegalese legal system, the Senegalese Code of Criminal Procedure.28
Pursuant to these documents, victims may ask to participate as civil parties
at any stage of the investigation.29 The EAC is also empowered to order repara-
tions measures in accordance with article 27(1) of the EAC Statute, namely res-
titution, compensation, and rehabilitation.
With regard to reparations awards for compensation, the EAC may order30
that such measures be implemented by the Trust Fund established under art-
icle 28 of the EAC Statute for the benefit of victims of the crimes within the
jurisdiction of the EAC and their beneficiaries.31 Article 28 further provides
that the Trust Fund is to be financed by voluntary contributions from foreign
governments, international institutions, non-governmental organizations and
other sources willing to support the victims.32 Finally in this regard, the EAC
Statute does not limit reparations awards to registered civil parties; rather, it
provides that reparations may be awarded to victims, individually or collect-
ively, whether or not they have participated in proceedings before the EAC.33
Notably, however, the EAC Statute does not include a provision akin to
article 79(2) of the ICC Statute, which allows the ICC to order the transfer of
proceeds collected through forfeiture and / or fines to the TFV, or similar to
article 44 of the law on the establishment of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers
26 See S Williams “The Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese courts: An
African solution to an African problem?” (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal
Justice 1139; E Cimiotta “The first steps of the Extraordinary African Chambers new
mixed criminal tribunal?” (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 177; R Brody
“Bringing a dictator to justice: The case of Hissène Habré” (2015) 13 Journal of
International Criminal Justice 209. V Spiga “Non-retroactivity of criminal law: A new chap-
ter in the Hissène Habré saga” (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 5.
27 Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese Courts for the
Prosecution of International Crimes Committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1
December 1990 (EAC Statute), available in French at African Yearbook, above at note 25
at 411–26 and in English, id at 443–58.
28 Id, art 14(5). See also Cimiotta “The first steps”, above at note 26 at 188; M Fall “The
Extraordinary African Chambers: The case of Hissène Habré” in G Werle, L Fernandez
and M Vormbaum (eds) Africa and the International Criminal Court (2014, TMC Asser
Press) 117 at 123.
29 EAC Statute, ibid.
30 Id, art 27(2).
31 Id, art 28(1).
32 Ibid.
33 Id, art 28(2).
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and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office,34 which explicitly permits the tribunal to
order the sale of forfeited assets to finance reparation awards.35
Turning to penalties, the EAC is empowered to order fines in accordance
with the criteria provided under Senegalese law.36 Pursuant to article 24(2)
of the EAC Statute, the EAC is also able to order, as a penalty in addition to
imprisonment, forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or
indirectly from crime(s) for which a person is convicted. The EAC Statute fur-
ther provides that it is the responsibility of the state authorities in whose ter-
ritory such property and assets are located to enforce any forfeiture measures
requested.37 Furthermore, according to article 87 bis of the Senegalese Code of
Criminal Procedure, the EAC is empowered to order protective, pre-conviction
measures in respect of the assets of an accused person.38
REPARATIONS AWARDS AND FORFEITURE MEASURES AGAINST
HISSÈNE HABRÉ
On 30 May 2016, the EAC Trial Chamber issued its judgment in the case against
Hissène Habré, in which it found him guilty of crimes against humanity, the
crime of torture and war crimes, and sentenced him to life imprisonment.39
On 29 July 2016, the Trial Chamber handed down a further decision concern-
ing reparations,40 in which it awarded 20 million CFA francs to each victim of
rape and sexual slavery, 15 million CFA francs to prisoners of war and victims
of arbitrary detention, torture and other inhumane treatment, and 10 million
CFA francs to each indirect victim.41 These sums fell significantly short of the
amounts requested by the first two victim groups.42 The Trial Chamber also
refused the civil parties’ request to grant collective reparations.43 On 4 and 5
August 2016, respectively, the civil parties’ representatives filed appeals against
the decision on reparations with respect to several issues.
34 Law No 05/L-053 of 3 August 2015, available at: <https://www.kuvendikosoves.
org/common/docs/ligjet/05-L-053%20a.pdf> (last accessed 25 April 2019).
35 Id, art 44(6).
36 EAC Statute, above at note 27, art 24(1).
37 Id, art 26(5).
38 Art 87 bis provides: “When in receipt of a case file, the investigating judge can, on his
own initiative or at the request of a civil party or the prosecution, order protective mea-
sures in respect of the accused’s assets.” (author’s translation).
39 Judgment in Ministère Public v Hissein Habré Trial Chamber, 30 May 2016 (trial judgment).
40 Ministère Public v Hissein Habré Trial Chamber, 29 July 2016 (decision on reparations).
41 Id, para 82. At the time of writing, 20 million CFA francs is equivalent to approximately
USD 35,000, 15 million CFA francs is equivalent to approximately USD 26,500, and 10 mil-
lion CFA francs is equivalent to approximately USD 17,500.
42 Victims of rape had sought 60 million CFA francs, victims of sexual slavery 75 million
CFA francs, and victims of arbitrary detention, torture and other inhumane treatment
50 million CFA francs.
43 Decision on reparations, above at note 40, para 82.
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On 27 April 2017, the EAC Appeals Chamber issued its judgment, in which it
addressed, inter alia, the issues raised on appeal by the civil parties’ represen-
tatives.44 Notably, the Appeals Chamber fixed the total amount of reparations
payable to civil parties at over 82 billion CFA francs and sentenced Habré to
pay this amount.45 The Appeals Chamber further held that, at the time it
issued its judgment, Habré’s assets were insufficient to cover the totality of
the individual reparations awarded.46 The Appeals Chamber made a number
of additional significant orders in its judgment. First, it demanded that the
proceeds of all property that had already been seized, as well as any assets
belonging to Hissène Habré discovered in the future, be paid into the Trust
Fund to finance the reparations awards ordered.47 Secondly, the Appeals
Chamber instructed the Trust Fund continually to monitor Habré’s financial
situation with a view to identifying, freezing and seizing any proceeds of
crimes, property or assets.48 The Appeals Chamber further invited interested
states to cooperate with the Trust Fund to guarantee the realization of the
individual reparations awarded and the eventual implementation of a pro-
gramme of collective reparations.49 Finally, the Appeals Chamber encouraged
the Trust Fund to contact the Chadian government as well as interested states,
organizations and civil society associations with respect to implementing
collective and moral reparations.50
With regard to asset forfeiture measures, the Trial Chamber had rejected
the prosecutor’s request to impose such a penalty as neither justified nor
well founded.51 Furthermore, the Trial Chamber observed that the EAC
Investigative Chamber had seized assets belonging to Hissène Habré as a
protective measure to preserve the interests of civil parties to the proceedings
and that the prosecutor had failed to demonstrate that such assets resulted,
directly or indirectly, from the commission of his crimes.52 The Appeals
Chamber did not reverse the Trial Chamber’s finding.
The failure to secure a forfeiture order in this case can be attributed to the
difficulties facing the prosecutor in meeting the evidentiary threshold,
namely that any proceeds, property and / or assets be derived directly or indir-
ectly from the crime(s) for which a person is convicted.53 This begs the
44 Appeal judgment, above at note 1.
45 Id at 226. The exact figure was 82.29 billion CFA francs, a sum equivalent to more than
USD 145 million at the time of writing.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Trial judgment, above at note 39, para 2329. The prosecutor did not request the Trial
Chamber to order a fine against Habré, despite this penalty being available under the
EAC Statute.
52 Id, para 2330.
53 See C McCarthy Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court (2012,
Cambridge University Press) at 199–202.
 JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW VOL  , NO 
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021855319000159
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Northumbria, on 03 Oct 2019 at 11:52:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
question as to why Hissène Habré was not charged with the war crime of pil-
lage pursuant to article 7(2)(f) of the EAC Statute. The Appeals Chamber held
that the prejudice suffered by a substantial number of Habré’s victims
included pillage,54 but no such charge was brought to the attention of the
Trial Chamber for its determination. Although the prosecutor undoubtedly
has discretion with respect to the charges brought against an accused person,
surely the indictment ought to reflect fairly the (at this stage of the proceed-
ings, alleged) harm suffered by victims of the conduct under investigation.
Given that, in determining reparations, the Appeals Chamber found such a
large number of victims to have suffered from pillage, often in conjunction
with crimes for which Habré was convicted, the charges included in the indict-
ment do not appear to represent fairly the harm suffered. The Appeals
Chamber’s order that victims who experienced pillage are entitled to compen-
sation is also difficult to reconcile with the Trial Chamber’s earlier finding in
its decision on reparations that victim status is tied to the crimes for which
Habré was convicted.55
Another charge that could have been levied by the prosecutor was the exten-
sive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military neces-
sity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly, under article 7(1)(c) of the EAC
Statute. In its order, inter alia, committing the case to trial,56 the Investigative
Chamber noted that the prosecutor referred to this offence in his opening
submission, but failed to refer to it in his final submission.57 This led the
Investigative Chamber to rule on the matter, finding that, if individuals
were indeed victims of the “pillage” of their property, the circumstances in
which those acts were allegedly committed precluded the chamber from con-
sidering the crime.58 According to the Investigative Chamber, these “circum-
stances” included its finding that the conduct did not take place in the
context of an armed conflict, as required by the elements of a war crime.59
The Investigative Chamber made no such determination with regard to
pillage.
Equally, the absence of a forfeiture order against Hissène Habré could result
from a dearth of identified assets. Diab identifies a lack of effort to locate and
freeze Habré’s assets before or during the proceedings,60 but this fails to take
54 See appeal judgment, above at note 1, annex.
55 Decision on reparations, above at note 40, para 3.
56 Order for partial dismissal, indictment and remand to the Trial Chamber of the
Extraordinary African Chambers, Investigative Chamber, 13 February 2015
(Investigative Chamber order).
57 Id at 122.
58 Id at 123. It is noted that the French “pillage” can be translated to mean looting or pillage.
It is, however, argued that, to avoid confusion with the specific legal meaning afforded
to the war crime of pillage, the Investigative Chamber ought to have referred only to
alleged incidents of appropriation of property: appropriation de biens.
59 Investigative Chamber order, above at note 56 at 123.
60 Diab “Challenges in the implementation”, above at note 5 at 153.
V ICT IMS ’ JUST ICE? 
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021855319000159
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Northumbria, on 03 Oct 2019 at 11:52:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
into account that, during the investigation, the Investigative Chamber ordered
protective measures,61 pursuant to which two bank accounts and one piece of
real property in Habré’s name were frozen.62 However, no further assets have
been located, a fact about which civil society organizations expressed concern
after the delivery of the appeal judgment.63 This scarcity of assets also affects
the capacity of the Trust Fund to enforce the reparations awards ordered by
the EAC.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The EAC Appeals Chamber’s award of compensation equivalent to more than
USD 145 million to the victims of Hissène Habré’s crimes was a landmark deci-
sion recognizing the harm they suffered during his reign of terror in Chad. At
the same time, the implementation of such awards presents significant chal-
lenges for the EAC (and other ICTs) even in cases where convicted persons pos-
sess substantial assets. This is not to say that significant awards for reparations
should not be made against indigent accused; indeed, the majority of persons
convicted of international crimes have been found to be indigent. Rather, this
article has sought to shed light upon the difficulties in financing such awards,
proposing that fines and forfeiture of assets could provide useful vehicles to
secure funding in certain cases.
Although fines and assets forfeited by persons convicted of international
crimes are unlikely to satisfy reparation awards for compensation fully,64
they provide an avenue through which trust funds established at ICTs,65
including the TFV at the permanent ICC, might secure much-needed resources
to realize their respective mandates. Further, although reparation awards may
be made directly against persons convicted of international crimes, such mea-
sures do not fulfil the corrective function attributable to asset forfeiture as a
penalty in the constituent instruments of ICTs.66
61 Order for protective measures, Investigative Chamber, 29 October 2013.
62 Appeal judgment, above at note 1 at 296.
63 See for example Amnesty International “Chad: Hissène Habré appeal ruling closes dark
chapter for victims” (27 April 2017), available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-
releases/2017/04/chad-hissene-habre-appeal-ruling-closes-dark-chapter-for-victims/>
(last accessed 25 April 2019).
64 A possible, albeit hypothetical, exception could have been Muammar Gaddafi, whose net
worth at the time of his death is reported to have been in excess of USD 200 billion. See
P Richter “As Libyans take stock: Moammar Kadafi’s hidden riches astound” (22 October
2011) Los Angeles Times, available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/21/world/
la-fg-kadafi-money-20111022> (last accessed 25 April 2019).
65 On the EAC as an ICT, see Williams “The Extraordinary African Chambers”, above at note
26 at 1144–47. Compare with Cimiotta “The first steps”, above at note 26 at 189–97.
66 See R Young “Fines and forfeiture in international criminal justice” in R Mulgew and
D Abels (eds) Research Handbook on the International Penal System (2016, Edward Elgar)
102 at 109.
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In cases where the convicted persons are not deemed indigent, asset recov-
ery is crucial to give effect to both reparations awards mandated against them
as well as any fines and / or orders for the forfeiture of assets. Without such
assets, ICT trust funds are largely reliant on voluntary donations to operation-
alize reparations awards and fines, and forfeiture orders are difficult, if not
impossible, to enforce. In the case against Hissène Habré, although there
was no order for asset forfeiture as a penalty additional to imprisonment,
the EAC awarded significant reparations to his victims. In order that these
awards might be implemented, and victims might receive the compensation
to which they are entitled, it is critical that states and international organiza-
tions work to identify, trace, freeze and seize proceeds, property and assets
belonging to Habré. Diab identifies the need for publicity of the case in this
context, arguing that prominent cases “are more likely to translate into prac-
tical and legal steps meant to assist in the process of repatriating assets”.67 It
was, in part, the victims’ tenacity that led to the establishment of the EAC.
Notwithstanding the potential obstacles, it is consequently imperative that
Hissène Habré’s outstanding assets be recovered and transferred to the
victims, as intended in accordance with the awards made.
67 Diab “Challenges in the implementation”, above at note 5 at 154. In this respect, Diab
suggests (at 155) a potential role for investigative journalists: “Even in the event that
the information obtained by journalists would not be admissible in court, having
leads as to the location of assets could increase pressure on states to further investigate
and proceed to freezing and repatriation of assets.”
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